





































































From Wild West to the Godfather: Enforcement Market Structure
See Section 1 for details.
See Section 1 for more discussion. See Anderson and Bandiera (2001) for the analysis
of Maa protection of an endogenous volume of exchange.
Private enforcement of property rights arises where state enforcement
is weak. Our reading of history suggests that Maas such as the Sicilian
Maa, the Japanese Yakuza and contemporary Russian gangs are coali-
tions of enforcers. Yet a weak state does not always produce Maas, and
strong states do not always eliminate Maas. Enforcement market struc-
ture ranges from Wild West self-enforcement through specialized compet-
itive enforcement to monopoly. What factors explain market structure,
especially the emergence or disappearance of Maas? Is state enforcement
preferable to specialized private enforcement? For whom?
We provide a general equilibrium model of enforcement and its market
organization in a setting where predators attack the endowments of con-
sumer/owners who choose between self defense and the available forms of
specialized enforcement. Self enforcement is always feasible, so the gain
from self enforcement puts an endogenous bound on the price which spe-
cialized enforcers can charge. The volume of predation and specialized
enforcement and its market organization are all endogenous. Within this
framework we analyze two alternative market structures for private enforce-
ment: competition and monopoly. In this setting we explain two important
puzzles about monopoly persistence in the market for enforcement. First,
why is a Maa monopoly typically able to defeat defection by its members
on the one hand and entry by rivals on the other hand? Second, why does
the evolution of strong states face apparent di¢culty in displacing Maas
from the enforcement of legal rights?
For simplicity, we abstract from many details of particular Maas and
many elements of real economies. The only productive activities in the
model are the receipt of endowments by consumer/owners and the enforce-
ment of rights to the endowments against predators. Our exclusive focus
on the enforcement of legal property rights is appropriate because this is
what legitimizes new born Maas. The property to be defended is a spec-
trum of local endowments to individuals (think of livestock in the Sicilian
case, retail goods in the urban shopkeepers case). Property is attacked by
predators (thieves). Some property owners may opt for self defense, oth-
ers buy enforcement from a local specialized enforcer. The region contains






From Wild West to the Godfather: Enforcement Market Structure
We also ignore in this paper the nonenforcement activities of the individual Maa
members. In reality individual members exploit their reputation to engage in other, mostly
illegal, activities.The evidence suggests that these are not coordinated from the center,
however, and hence they are not properly Maa activities in our view. A good analogy
of our view of the Maa is a franchise operation such as McDonalds, which protects its
brand and optimizes the number of franchises.
Social norms may help sustain the coalitions too.
themselves throughout the region of property owners. In the competitive
mode of enforcement, the number of specialized enforcers in the region de-
termined in a spatial monopolistic competition model. The monopoly mode
of enforcement (the Maa) is a coalition of local specialized enforcers which
optimizes the size of its membership. The coalition could, in principle, dic-
tate the pricing/service policies of its members, but we follow the existing
evidence which suggests that Maa coordination of enforcement is quite
limited, resembling the cooperation of neighboring police departments.
The equilibrium market structure of enforcement  Maa, competitive
or self-enforcement  is related to the real income of productive agents.
Intuition and casual empiricism suggest that predation and enforcement
are countercyclical and will fall with secular growth. However, very poor
regions do not usually have Maas. Consistent with this observation, we
show in a simulation of our model that passing from low development (low
opportunity cost of predators) to high development (high opportunity cost
of predators), the market structure switches from a stage with no Maa to
a stage with Maa enforcement and then switches back to a stage with no
Maa again.
Given conditions favorable to Maa existence, our model gives
reasons why the Maa coalition is stable. On the one hand, existing mem-
bers have little incentive to defect given that they are free to optimize on
their price/service policies. On the other hand, the Maa forestalls breakup
from competitive entry by maintaining excess capacity in the form of Maa
hangers on.
Once the Maa coalition has gained monopoly power in the enforcement
market, we shows that it pays to use such power for extortion. That is, the
Maa always has an incentive to prey on unprotected properties to raise
the demand for its services. Genuine enforcement and extortion are thus
complementary activities for the Maa coalition.
Maa persistence in the presence of strong democratic states (for ex-
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welfarist state cares about the poor who cannot a¤ord or be a¤orded en-
forcement. The poor su¤er a negative externality from the predators de-
ected from protected onto unprotected property. Private enforcers and
their rich customers neglect this externality and do better without state
enforcement. The Maa (and competitive enforcers) may choose
also to protect a higher fraction of property than the welfarist state. In
this case, a state which attempts to substitute its optimal policy for pri-
vate enforcement may fail because all its potential customers, the high value
property owners, prefer the Maa  in the enforcement
business.
Our analysis has important policy implications. Our view implies that,
as coalitions of enforcers, Maas have ambiguous e¤ects on welfare. As
they enforces legal activities, they may be benecial; providing what the
state cannot. But as the state grows more capable, the Maas potentially
excessive enforcement of high value legal property makes its presence unde-
sirable. Where the activity is illegal (drugs), Maa enforcement may cause
undesirable expansion. In this paper the Maa a¤ects only the distribution
of the property between the owners and the predators due to our assump-
tion of a xed supply of property. In our sequel paper we model the Maas
enforcement of exchange, featuring the expansion of activity under Maa
enforcement.
Section 1 provides context for our paper. We review the historical de-
scriptive evidence on Maas and the recent formal economic literature on
predation and Maas. Section 2 sets out the basic elements of the model
and derives the competitive enforcement equilibrium. Section 3 derives the
Maa equilibrium. Section 4 considers the formation and stability of the
Maa coalition. Section 5 analyzes the Maas incentive to engage in extor-
tion. Section 6 contrasts the Maa equilibrium with a welfare-maximizing
state enforcement policy. Section 7 concludes.
The view of Maas as enforcers was proposed by Schelling (1984) and richly
elaborated by Gambetta (1994). The available historical evidence suggests
that originally Maas were coalitions of guardians who provided enforce-
ment of legitimate rights. Maas typically developed after major property
rights reforms that were not matched by the establishment of adequate4 From Wild West to the Godfather: Enforcement Market Structure
formal enforcement mechanisms. The Sicilian Maa emerged soon after
the abolition of feudalism (1812-1840) when private property was created,
land ownership became more di¤used and there was no formal authority
to protect the newly established rights (Bandiera, 2000; Gambetta, 1994).
Absentee landowners and fragmentation of landholdings brought no xed
settlement on the land, hence the landlords and their rootless tenants were
weak relative to the predators who would prey on their farms. (Tenants
would not risk much to defend property not their own. Landlords were
usually not present to defend their property.) Security guards who for-
merly had been hired by feudal lords to patrol their large estates o¤ered to
provide protection to the new landlords. Enforcement was at rst a com-
petitive activity; each Maa family operated in its own territory with little
interaction among each other (see Gambetta, 1994). Eventually, coalitions
formed. Similarly, the rise of the yakuza in Japan coincided with two ma-
jor property rights reforms. The rst was implemented during the Meiji
period (1868-1911) when feudalism was abolished and a modern property
rights regime was put into place; the second took place during the Allied
Occupation after World War II when new rights were established and land
was redistributed further. In both cases the reform was not matched by ef-
fective formal enforcement bodies. For example, the police were dismantled
by the Allied Forces and were thus unable to maintain public order (Milha-
put and West, 1999; Hill 2000). The Russian Maa also emerged when, as
a consequence of privatization and the collapse of the communist regime,
private ownership became more widespread, property rights legislation was
inadequate and public enforcement highly ine¤ective (Varese 1994).
Once their reputation is established, Maas typically branch into the
enforcement of illegal deals within legal markets and into the protection of
illegal activities. We abstract for simplicity from these important activities.
The existing evidence suggests that, for instance, the Sicilian and American
Maa are actively involved in sustaining cartel arrangements between rms
in sectors as diverse as construction, transport and vegetable wholesale (see
Gambetta and Reuter 1995). Similar evidence exists for Japan (Woodhall
1996). Finally, Maas act as governments in the underworld, that is they
collect taxes in exchange for governmental services such as dispute settle-
ment, contract rights enforcement but also protection from competitors and
from the police (Firestone 1997). Interestingly, there is evidence that gangs
operating in low income areas of US cities play a role similar to that of the
major organized crime groups. Akerlof and Yellen (1994) report that gangs5 From Wild West to the Godfather: Enforcement Market Structure
perform government-like functions both in illegal and legal markets within
their territory. Gangs control drug-dealing but they also protect residents
from theft and violence by other gangs. That residents often prefer gang
services to police services where the police are perceived to be ine¤ective
and/or unfair suggests that, just like Maas, gangs rise when there is no
adequate formal enforcement mechanism. Compared to Maas, however,
gangs have so far failed to form a coalition and they are more akin to
monopolistically competitive rms di¤erentiated on the basis of location.
Private enforcement of property rights and the analysis of organized
groups have recently been formally analyzed in the economic literature.
deMeza and Gould (1992) analyze decentralized enforcement of property
rights. They show that individual choices might be socially ine¢cient in
the sense that either too much or too little enforcement is provided in equi-
librium. Konrad and Skaperdas (1999) add to the analysis of decentralized
enforcement by exploring four alternative market structures: individual en-
forcement (as in deMeza and Gould (1992)), collective enforcement (where
individuals cooperate to provide enforcement), enforcement by a private,
prot-maximizing monopolist and nally enforcement by a set of compet-
ing private enforcers. They show that the latter is the most stable market
structure. Compared to these works, our paper carries the analysis of mar-
ket structure one step forward. We allow competing enforcers to form a
coalition which, as suggested by the empirical evidence, controls member-
ship size but, unlike a monopolistic enforcer, does not the pricing policies
of its members. That the coalition only controls the size of its membership
guarantees stability, as argued in section 4 below. In line with deMeza
and Gould (1992) we nd that the amount of protection o¤ered by private
enforcers is socially ine¢cient.
Dixit (2001), Grossman (1995), Polo (1995) share our view of Maas
as enforcers and analyze issues complementary to those discussed in this
paper. Dixit (2001) analyzes enforcement of contract, rather than prop-
erty, rights. He develops a dynamic model in which each period pairs of
individuals are randomly matched and make transactions that cannot be
legally enforced and in which cooperation cannot be sustained by repu-
tation alone. He shows that a prot-motivated private intermediary can
provide enforcement, albeit not socially optimal enforcement, in equilib-
rium. Grossman (1995) analyses the interaction between the Maa and the
State when both institutions provide revenue-maximizing property rights
enforcement. He show that as long as the State remains viable (i.e. Maa6
against
2 Competitive Enforcement
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activity is not too disruptive), the presence of an alternative enforcement
agency increases citizens welfare because it reduces the monopoly power
of the State and hence its rent-extraction capability. Polo (1995) analyses
the incentive structure and the internal organization within a single group,
e.g. within a single Maa family and shows how incentive costs determine
the optimal group size.
Finally Skaperdas and Syropoulos (1995) analyze the origins of Maa-
like groups in the context of a model in which there is no State to enforce
property rights and agents must decide how to allocate resources between
productive and appropriative activities. Productive activities generate out-
put while appropriative activities only determine its distribution. They ar-
gue that agents with a comparative advantage in appropriative activities
will rule by coercion. In contrast, we maintain that the main function of
Maas is to sell enforcement predation instead of being primarily
engaged in it. Maas as enforcers are commonly viewed as extorters 
o¤ering protection from the Maas own violence. In our model, extortion
is at most an enhancement of the Maas enforcement business rather than
the basis of it (see Section 5).
Property owners, specialized enforcers and predators interact in the mar-
ket for enforcement. This interaction is rich with externalities: specialized
enforcement deects predators onto self-defended property, additional spe-
cialized enforcers raise the success rate of incumbent enforcers against a
given supply of predators, and additional predators raise the success rate
of incumbent predators.
Specialized enforcers interact in monopolistic competition because the
reputation and capability of a local enforcer reaches only over short dis-
tances. Taking Western Sicily as our motivating example, villages are dis-
tributed throughout the region and the enforcers locate in the main villages.
We abstract from intervillage di¤erences and any irregularities of geogra-
phy. Predators spread themselves across the region to equalize their rate
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If the property distribution is uniform, the buyers are distributed on the unit cone with
the top of the cone having the highest value property. For other valuation distributions,
all horizontal cross sections remain circular with radii which decrease with height, but the
cone may be distorted vertically so that the radii need not decrease linearly.
Assume that buyers of unit mass are uniformly located on a unit circle and
at each location on the circle there is an identical distribution of property
ranked from high to low value. The buyers valuation of property at each
location is thus distributed according to where is the proportion
of buyers on the radial section with valuation greater than or equal to ,
and This model of valuation can be rationalized in several other
ways, but ours is simple and plausible.
If enforcement is purchased, the buyers subjective probability of enjoy-
ing his property is equal to If he does not buy enforcement his subjective
probability of enjoying his property is equal to For specialized enforce-
ment to be purchased at all, The value of enforcement to the
marginal buyer is ( The value of each property is known only
to its owner, but enforcers and predators know the distribution of values.
All buyers with valuation greater than or equal to ( will buy
enforcement when the enforcer charges a price equal to ( . In-
framarginal property owners enjoy a surplus. The assignment of buyers to
an enforcer at each location is unique when a collection cost increasing in
distance is added. The cost is assumed to be tiny to abstract from further
accounting.
All property is subject to attack by predators of mass (for Bandits).
The predator knows whether property is protected or not, which gives him
information on its expected value. The predators share the common beliefs
so those who choose to attack random pieces of unprotected property have a
subjective probability of successful stealing equal to and those who
choose to attack random pieces of protected property have a subjective
probability of stealing equal to
We analyze the symmetric equilibrium of our spatial structure. Thus
of the predators mass is located in each enforcers market area and
of the property ownersmass is located in each enforcers market area,
while a fraction of properties are protected. This is consistent with
rational expectations, as we now show.



























































From Wild West to the Godfather: Enforcement Market Structure
In contrast, the conict literature (e.g., Grossman, 1995; Skaperdas and Syropoulos,
1995) models interaction of one predator and one prey as a contest, with success deter-
mined by predetermined force levels which are optimally chosen at an earlier stage. The
anonymous interaction model is distinct because (i) agents are probability takers and (ii)
success depends on relative numbers due to interaction in which one side seeks and the
other side hides.
depends on the relative numbers of self-enforcers and predators. The prey
have some capacity to evade the predators through hiding their goods,
moving them about or coordinating warnings. We assume plausibly that
in this anonymous hide-and-seek interaction the success rate depends on
the ratio of the numbers on each side. Specically, the realized (objective)
probability of successful ownership is equal to
(1)
Here is the fraction of predators who choose to prey on protected prop-
erty. Thus is the mass of predators who choose to attack
unprotected property on each market segment. Similarly is the
mass of unprotected property owners in each market segment. Then
is the average intensity of predator to prey on unprotected property. is
a technological parameter reecting the relative e¤ectiveness of predator
to prey activity on unprotected property. Equation (1) implies that, if
is equal to and the mass of predators and unprotected property owners
is equal, the probability of successful evasion is equal to A rise in
lowers the probability of successful evasion as predators become relatively
more e¤ective. Finally, as is plausible, is increasing in decreasing in
and homogeneous of degree zero in Note the important negative
externality inicted by those who purchase enforcement on those who do
not: Intuitively, those who buy enforcement deect thieves
onto those who do not, lowering their probability of successful defence.
The realized probability of successful ownership when protected by the
specialized enforcer is assumed at each location to be equal to
(2)
Here is a parameter reecting the relative e¤ectiveness of o¤ensive tech-
























































From Wild West to the Godfather: Enforcement Market Structure
The success rate of protected property owners is given by a compound of the proba-
bility of evasion and the probability that the specialized producer recovers stolen goods.
The latter is formed by allowing the parameter to reect the relative e¤ectiveness of
o¤ensive and protective e¤ort in specifying the probability of a recovery of stolen goods:
Dene the implicit function which will set the second ratio equal to 1 always.
It can be shown that this function and the resulting probability of recovery of stolen goods
have reasonable properties in and .
The single enforcer in principle knows he a¤ects his success rate by his capacity
We simplify by assuming that is xed for any individual enforcer, noting that it can be
shown that endogenous choice of turns out to add no new inisght. In contrast, when
predators who choose to attack protected property in each market, while
represents the enforcement capability of the enforcer to deter attack or
to recover the value taken by predators who choose to attack. (Any di¤er-
ence between the technology of self protection and specialized protection
is subsumed into to conserve notation.) This assumption is a very con-
venient simplication of a reduced form which compounds two activities.
First, protected property owners continue to rationally evade predators at
no cost. Second, the specialized enforcer acts to pursue predators and re-
cover their loot. By appropriately restricting the functional form of the
probability of recovery, we derive as a convenient reduced form equation
(2). The number of protected properties a¤ects the probability of
successful defense indirectly through its e¤ect on the number of predators
that attack protected property
In rational expectations equilibrium, the subjective value of must be
equal to the realized value of in the interaction of predators and prey
and subjective value of must be equal to the objective performance of
the enforcer The property owners are probability takers, as is plausible
when they are in large numbers. The anonymous group of predators of size
cannot a¤ect their success rate by their preparations due to their
individual anonymity, so they are probability-takers as well. In contrast,
the enforcer is not anonymous because there is only one enforcer on each
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From Wild West to the Godfather: Enforcement Market Structure
The enforcers maximize prots by selecting the optimal proportion of
customers in their area to serve, . They cannot price discriminate because
they cannot observe the valuations of their customers The enforcer incurs
a cost of establishing capability The enforcers choice problem is:
(3)
The enforcer has market power through realizing that is declining in
There are two other channels of market power which we suppress. First
the share of protected property a¤ects the success rate on unprotected
property ( is decreasing in Second, the share of protected property
a¤ects the returns to attacking both protected and unprotected property
and therefore determines i.e. the share of predators who attack pro-
tected property. Thus an enforcer with full sophistication replaces
with in the optimization problem. We assume the
enforcer takes the probability as exogenous because it reects the equilib-
rium interaction of anonymous predators and unprotected property owners
across, in principle, the entire region. We assume the enforcer plays Nash
against the predators, taking the number of predators as given. Since
reputation is xed, this means is exogenous. Our probability-taking
we consider the Maa coalition of enforcers, a key element of the problem is that the
organization optimally selects the aggregate force level with which to oppose the set
of predators taking account of its e¤ect on the contest success rate
This assumption is an inessential detail  perfect price discrimination allows the
enforcer to obtain all the buyers surplus but the remainder of the model is similar.
The capacity cost plausibly varies with the number of predators the enforcer has to
deal with, but we assume the enforcer plays Nash against the predators and thus takes
the mass of predators as given. The number of predators the enforcer has to deal with
is equal to the probability that a protected property will be attacked, times
the number of protected properties We suppress any other e¤ect of the volume of
protected property such as collection costs which might rise with the number of customers
in specifying the cost of reputation .
The cost reects the enforcers exogenous opportunity cost outside the region (which
may be the same as the predators opportunity cost), but may also include added elements
specic to enforcement (the need to establish a reputation requires investment).
In equilibrium of course, as predators attack the unprotected
properties on his segment, the interaction on his own market segment is the same as that
anywhere else. A sophisticated enforcer might understand the equilibrium and hence be
able to optimize the e¤ect of on while assuming that all other enforcers would similarly
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We abstract from punishment of predators who are caught preying on protected prop-
erty, without loss of generality. With a su¢ciently harsh punishment, no predators will
ever attack protected property. For less harsh punishments, the e¤ect of the size of pun-
ishment is simply to raise the equilibrium and lower the equilibrium without changing
any qualitative properties of the system.
enforcer will in Nash equilibrium have his expectations realized,
and Thus the optimal proportion of property owners served, is
determined by:
(4)
With free entry by competitive enforcers, there are zero prots, so the
number of enforcers adjusts such that:
(5)
We assume that is invariant to rationalized by innitely elastic supply
of enforcers from outside the region at a xed opportunity cost.
The proportion of predators, who attack protected property is de-
termined by the equality of expected return in attacks on the two types of
property:
(6)
where the left hand side of the equation is the return from attacking un-
protected (low value) property and the term on the right is the expected
return from attacking protected (high value) property, and is the ex-
pectation operator. It is convenient to deploy compact notation for the
average high and low value properties:
Finally, the mass of predators includes all agents whose alternative
option is worse than the expected payo¤ from predation. Normalizing the
maximum potential number of predators to one and assuming that alter-
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For su¢ciently large and su¢ciently small,
and specialized enforcement is o¤ered in symmetric equilibrium
to a unique fraction of property .
We avoid complex questions of the origin of reputation in a dynamic setting by as-
suming expenditure of creates a capabilty which results in anticipated reputation
for e¤ectiveness modelled as above. Reputational models generally have multiple Nash
equilibria. A zero enforcement equilibrium obtains if enforcers have no reputation, buyers
expect their services to have no value, hence they never buy protection and the enforcers
never have the opportunity to demonstrate their ability and thus create a reputation.
Symmetrically there is always a zero predation equilibrium: if predators expect to always
fail, they never attack and hence never discover that they could be successful. History such
as that of 19th century Sicily tells us that initial conditions matter in creating reputation.
The condition is evaluated at because if any protection were to be o¤ered it would
protect that fraction of property.
The objective probability is undened since . The equilibrium depends
on the expectations of self-defense success There are two cases: if property owners and
The full equilibrium of the system is reached when the predators al-
location condition (6), the predators entry condition (7), the enforcers
choice of customers (4) and the free entry condition (5) are all satised
with the anticipated probabilities being equal to the values implied by the
contest success functions (2) and (1). This 6 equation system determines
We are mainly interested in interior equilibrium. If it exists, we are in-
terested in su¢cient conditions to guarantee that it is unique among the
symmetric equilibria. It is possible that no interior solution exists, and ei-
ther (no enforcement is o¤ered) or (all property is protected).
The no enforcement case is more likely as xed costs are high relative to
willingness to pay while the full enforcement case arises when the elasticity
of demand remains su¢ciently far above one throughout the range of
In the Appendix we prove:
When the solution is ( ), which
implies that there will be no predators and no demand for enforcement.
When is too small, no specialized enforcer can break even. When
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predators are pessimistic about the e¤ectivness of their self-defense and there
is an interior solution with . This solution
exists as long as Alternatively, if property owners and predators are optimistic
about self-defense ( the equilibrium is at
The model of private enforcement equilibrium has interesting comparative
statics, summarized in Table 1. Besides the parameters presented above,







If alternative opportunities worsen ( falls), if predators become more
e¤ective ( increases) or if property value increases ( increases) there will
be more predators ( increases) but also more enforcers ( increases) in
equilibrium. Intuitively, since there are more predators both protected and
unprotected property is less safe (both and fall), yet has to fall more
than in order to keep the allocation constraint(6) satised. It follows that,
given the price of enforcement is higher, which makes more enforcers
enter the market.
If enforcers become more e¤ective (i.e. increases), there will be fewer
predators but also fewer enforcers in equilibrium. Intuitively when enforcers
are more e¤ective protected property is safer. To satisfy the allocation
constraint unprotected property must also become safer otherwise we end
up in the corner solution where predators attack only unprotected property.
Given that increases more than the price of enforcement is lower and
this drives enforcers out of the market.
Finally if the xed cost of enforcement increases there will be more
predators in equilibrium, property (both protected and unprotected) will be
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In the Sicilian case, Maa families within each province formed a coalition in the late
50s. The function of the coalition was to settle disputes within and between families, to
chose family heads whenever a power vacuum occurred and, most importantly, to regulate
mergers, divisions and allocation of territory.
Later on in its history, the Maa organization hires extra enforcers at competitive
wages as distinguished from its members who have shares in total prots.
we expect to fall as increases. When this happens, though, both
and fall. As explained above, has to fall more than in order to keep
the allocation constraint satised. It follows that, given the price of
enforcement is higher, which has a countervailing e¤ect on the number of
enforcers in equilibrium.
The equilibrium solution is homogeneous of degree zero in ; re-
spectively property valuation and the outside options of predators and
enforcers We regard economic development in the context of our model
as a rise in relative to or , as reecting real income increases of a
non-property owning class.
The Maa is a coalition of the enforcers that limits its numbers to achieve
positive prots. Although the Maa head could in principle dictate the
pricing/service policies of its members, we regard this as an unrealistically
centralized model of the organization. A loose coalition which only con-
trols entry is consistent with the available evidence on actual coalitions.
Moreover, as shown below, a loose coalition is compatible with the observed
structure and persistence of the Maa. Indeed, although detailed price di-
rectives could potentially lead to higher prots, they would also o¤er more
opportunities to cheat.
Formally, the Maa head optimizes joint prots (equal to individual
prots of the members) over We take total prot to be the relevant
objective function because, as explained below, in the formation of the
coalition, some of the original number of enforcers must be retired and
compensated with a share of the prots. The Maa may be able to freely
optimize or it may face the need to increase su¢ciently to prevent
entry by ensuring that potential entrants cannot cover their costs. We
consider both cases, taking the unconstrained case here and examining the


























































































For su¢ciently large and su¢ciently small,
and a unique interior monopoly solution exists.
The optimal chosen by the coalition, , is lower than
the one that would result under monopolistic competition.
understands that each enforcer will choose to protect a share of the
properties in his area, where is chosen so as to achieve (
Considering the selection of optimal as part of the prot maximization
problem we have:
The optimal selection of is assumed to take and as given; the monop-
olist plays Nash with respect to the number of predators. The rst order
condition for is:
(8)
The rst order condition is necessary and su¢cient for an optimum since
the objective function is concave in
The equilibrium system for determining all endogenous variables with
a Maa enforcement organization is formed by replacing the zero prot
condition of monopolistic competition (5) with the rst order condition in
Then:
see the Appendix.
Monopoly restricts the level of enforcement, as is intuitive. Formally:
To compare the equilibria we solve the sub-system








































>; > < <; >:
R
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That is, , , O¤setting
this disadvantage of monopoly, if uncoordinated enforcers have higher costs of obtaining a
reputation , the Maa equilibrium can be more secure than the competitive equilibirum.
The comparative statics on the number of enforcers are slightly more complex. If
(i.e. the V function is steep) moves in the opposite direction of thus all
the comparative statics are like those in Table 1. On the other hand if and
is very small, there might be a region in which moves in the same direction as so that
results are reversed. Note that guarantees positive prots.
This yields The Appendix shows that prots
are monotonically decreasing in . This implies that the equilibrium num-
ber of enforcers must be smaller under the Maa than under monopolistic
competition. QED.
Security of property su¤ers from the organization of the coalition as
follows. All else equal, if the enforcers form a coalition property will be less
secure; the price of enforcement will be higher; there will be more predators;
and the share of predators that choose to attack protected property will be
higher.
These results (prots to the Maa coexisting with more predators and
a lower share of unprotected property) all resemble the popular intuition
that the Maa acts as an extorter rather than an enforcer. Despite its
clean hands, the Maa looks guilty. Section 4 shows that starting from a
nonextortionate equilibrium, the Maa does always have an incentive to
increase its prots by extortion, paying predators to prey on unprotected
property. It may be restrained from doing so by social status or legal
restrictions (interpreting the Maa as a legal private enforcement agency).
The comparative statics of the model are similar to those reported in
section 1.3 above. The prots of the coalition are equal to:
which is decreasing in It follows that prots are higher when the market
for enforcement is tighter, either because of high demand (high , low )
or because of low supply (high , low ). It is also interesting to note
that prots per member are decreasing in
and and increasing in . These comparative statics provide a channel
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4 Coalition Formation and Stability
4.1 Coalition Formation
From Wild West to the Godfather: Enforcement Market Structure
evaluated at the number of enforcers under
competitive equilibrium.
Conict can of course result in coalitions which destroy opposing rivals. This may be
associated with errors or asymmetries in a rational maximizing environment.
discuss these forces after incorporating the cost of organizing the coalition,
as a richer story then emerges.
Coalitions frequently form peacably, and we focus on these. To form
a coalition the enforcers must sustain some coordination cost, which is
increasing in . A necessary condition for a mutually agreed coalition is
that everybody, i.e. including those that either exit the market or become
employees of other enforcers, is better o¤. The necessary condition for
coalition formation is that the total coalition prots (potential benet)
exceed the coordination cost
A similar rationale applies to the coalition in its
maturity. As we show below, the Maa forestalls breakup from competitive
entry by maintaining a fringe of hangers-on at some wage. This constitutes
an excess capacity (up to the competitive level of enforcement) which deters
entry, as we show below. That powerful Sicilian families let smaller families
operate in their territory under their direct supervision (Gambetta 1994)
supports our assumption about the structure of the coordination cost.
Assume that the coordination cost is linear in the number of original mem-
bers, the monopolistic competition solution . The net prots from form-
ing the coalition are , where is the optimized prot
of the coalition, is the per capita cost of coordination and
The coalition can form only if This necessary condition is also suf-
cient with rational enforcers provided the coordination cost reects all
costs.
Key insight into when coalitions form is gained from the comparative
statics of coalition net prots. The comparative statics are not a trivial
extension of previous results because a¤ects and in a similar way.
For instance, a fall in increases coalition prots while at the same time it
increases the number of enforcers and hence the coordination costs. Further























4.2 Why the Coalition Is Stable
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If is linear then prots are increasing in when is
small and decreasing when is large.
see the Appendix.
Maas are likely to
emerge at intermediate stages of development.
It could be argued that development might increase the value of property as well as
the bandits outside option. Allowing for this additional e¤ect complicates the analysis
but leaves the results substantially unchanged if the increase in is su¢ciently larger
than the increase in
For the simulation we assume that (when xed); (=1/4
expected value of unprotected property, when xed) and
If we assume that economic development improves the bandits income
in alternative occupations, the Lemma implies that
If were very high there
would be no bandits and no scope for enforcement (since there is no interior
solution when is high). If were very low there would be many bandits
and many enforcers in monopolistic competition. The latter would make the
transition to the coalition structure di¢cult because of coordination costs.
Figure 1 in the Appendix simulates our model. Similarly, if is high at
the start there will be only a few enforcers in monopolistic competition,
which implies that they can coordinate and move to a coalition very easily
(see Figure 2 in the Appendix). Interestingly, this is consistent with the fact
that the founders of most Maas were people with an existing reputation for
strength/brutality like the Sicilian feudal guards and the Japanese samurai.
It is also consistent with the fact that Maas emerged only in some of the
cases in which the rule of law was missing. We could argue that in the
other cases, private enforcers did exist when the state was weak but didnt
manage to collude and thus survive the conditions that determined their
rise in the rst place.
Coalitions in general are di¢cult to enforce in the absence of legal mecha-
nisms to restrain opportunistic behavior. The incentives to defect rise with
the prots of the coalition. The success of Maa coalitions thus presents
something of a puzzle: stable, long- lived and protable coalitions persist
despite a complete absence of legal enforceability.
Members incentive to defect and outside enforcers incentive to enter
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For the coalition is stable. For
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This is so for two reasons. First, reputation requires investment by the enforcer to
acquire and maintain. An individual enforcer acting alone has limited ability to impress
the surrounding population with his e¢ciency and brutality whereas coalition members
can benet from other members reputation and are thus able to achieve a given level
of reputation at lower cost than it would take to acquire it on their own. Second, the
organization can share information and apprehension of the predators who attempt to run
away into other jurisdictions, much as local law enforcement agencies cooperate in legal
enforcement activity. This increases the capability of the individual enforcers.
technology of the Maa and that of individual enforcers. The organization
plausibly has a better technology, reected in a smaller expenditure for
given reputation than do independent enforcers.
Note that, since the coalition does not dictate the price/service policies
of its members, the latter cannot cheat in the classical sense. Competitive
entry is therefore the main threat to the coalitions survival. The power of
the Maa to maintain its coalition against competitive outsiders depends
on the excess capacity it has retired in order to form in the rst place. Let
be the xed cost entrants have to pay to acquire reputation Dene
gross revenues ; as shown in the Appendix.
Prots for the coalition are equal to .
Proof:
1. if the xed cost of entrants is high enough, , then no one
will nd it protable to enter.
2. If but still not too high somebody
will enter but there will not be enough pressure to make the coalition
split (i.e. coalition prots are still positive, despite entry). The coali-
tions best response in this case is to increase and drive the entrants
out of the market. Indeed, following entry, the coalitions prots would
be: Whereas if the
coalition increases its membership up to its prots would be
which is larger
than It is then credible for the coalition to say that in
case of entry it will raise slightly above , generating negative
prots for the entrants.




























5 The Maa as Predator
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If entrants face the same xed cost as the Maa, they will enter until
, which implies that If new en-
forcers enter the market the coalition prots will equal:
Clearly, this cannot be an equilibrium and the coalition
will break down. Now there are too many enforcers in the market, all mak-
ing negative prots so that some enforcers must exit. It is reasonable to
think that the new entrants will be pushed out for they are less well known
as enforcers. In this case the coalition is knife-edge stable, i.e. there is
an equilibrium in which the coalition makes positive prots and is never
attacked, QED.
The stability result should be qualied on two lines. On the one hand,
note that in the knife edge case, an asymmetry which favors entrants will
tip the balance to successful entry. Moreover, case 2 must be qualied when
the xed cost advantage of the Maa is o¤set by a coordination cost
which is plausibly increasing and strictly convex in the number of Maa
members . Previously we have set and Obviously, as
is large, the Maa nds it costly to drive large enough to displace
all competitive rms, so the equilibrium includes a competitive fringe. On
the other hand, the comparative statics of the Maa coalition show that
as the Maas experience and reputation grows ( rises), then the optimal
falls. This lowers the coordination cost and makes the Maa still more
impervious to outside competition. This is an important aspect of the
apparent stability of Maas over time.
Our treatmentof the Maa analyzes its socially productive role as a provider
of enforcement services. The Maa is often alternatively portrayed as an
extorter, o¤ering enforcement from harm it will inict unless payment is
made. As explained above, we focus on the role of the Maa as an enforcer
of lawful rights because this guaranteed legitimacy and promoted the rise
of the Maa in the rst place. Once established, however, the Maa had
enough power to also act as an extorter. A simple extension of our model
formalizes a synthesis of the two views. The Maa coalition of the pre-
ceding sections can increase its prots by engaging in some predation on
unprotected property, thereby raising demand for its enforcement. The
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to the expected gain from predation on unprotected property plus an ex-
tra payment from the Maa. We assume the Maa optimally selects the
amount of extra predation.
Predators allocate themselves between protected and unprotected prop-
erty to equalize the return, which is equal to the opportunity cost of the
marginal predator. The opportunity costs are assumed to be uniformly
distributed on the interval This leads to the expression for indepen-
dent predators supply:
Now assume that the Maa wishes to raise the level of predation above
that level. It can hire predators and assure them a payment equal to their
opportunity cost. This leads to a supply of Maa licensed predators equal
to:
The total supply of predators is equal to By controlling its pay-
ment the Maa controls the supply of predators at the margin. The
licensed predators will prey only on unprotected property, but the equilib-
rium allocation condition of unlicensed predators continues to determine
the fraction of all predators who attack protected property by equality of
returns between attacks on protected and unprotected property.
The Maa coalition controls the number of enforcers and the payment
to licensed predators We assume away potential entry for simplicity. The
e¢cient Maa solves:
The rst order condition with respect to is
(9)
It can be shown that the square bracket term is always positive when
as required for equilibrium. This implies that it always pays for the Maa to
enlist at least some licensed predators to raise demand for its services. The
optimal interior values of and are implied by the rst order conditions,22
m; :
6 Optimal vs. Private Enforcement
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legal
even a strong state may not be able to
maintain its policy against private enforcement.
cream skim
provided the second order conditions are met. The objective function is
not necessarily concave in especially for arbitrary values of Therefore
it is possible that the best solution for the Maa is to enlist all available
predators. We ignore this possibility in our discussion. The main point is
that the Maa will always have an incentive to prey on the unprotected,
subsidizing attacks on unprotected property.
How important is the Maas incentive to prey on the unprotected? If
small,we may expect that cultural norms prevent the Maa from predatory
behavior. If the incentives are large, we may expect that norms fail and
avarice prevails. If the Maa is interpreted as a legitimate private protection
agency, then legal restrictions prevent extortion.
States are often represented as maximizing a social welfare function with
their policies, justied by thinking of redistributive policies. Welfare max-
imizing policy on property rights enforcement is thus interesting to
compare with private Maa or competitive enforcement whether or not we
believe any states closely approach this behavior. Intuitively we expect that
welfare-maximizing state policy will protect more property with a greater
intensity of force than will a monopoly enforcer when all else is equal. In
contrast, our model implies that (1) the welfare-maximizing state will al-
ways defend any given proportion of property less intensively than would
Maa or competitive enforcement and (2) the state could choose to defend a
lower proportion of property. These at rst puzzling results arise because of
the negative externality which enforcement inicts on the undefended prop-
erty  the welfarist state cares about the deection of predation onto low
value property whereas the private enforcers do not. We give an example
of optimal underenforcement by the state below.
In circumstances where the welfare-maximizing state defends a lower
proportionof propertyless intensively,
All its potential customers
for enforcement would prefer the private organization of enforcement. Pri-
vate enforcement in either its competitive or Maa version may then come
along and the most valuable property. As an example of this
phenomenon, think of the growth of gated communities containing people
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batten onto the low value state protected or unprotected property with
greater intensity, increasing the incentive to defect from state enforcement.
The cream skimming problem in enforcement is more general than our
setup might indicate. For example, the political support function ap-
proach models the state as maximizing a combination of contributions from
its supporters (in our model, the rich) and the general welfare (reecting the
interests of the poor voters). The political support maximizing state cares
more about the poor than does the Maa and may face cream skimming.
The welfarist state has several options when facing cream skimming.
At one extreme, when it is weak, it can forestall the privatization of en-
forcement by abandoning its welfare-maximizing policy and imitating the
Maa. This solution resembles state enforcement policy being captured
by the rich. But since Maa enforcement potentially has advantages over
an imitative state, even imitating the Maa may not su¢ce to eliminate
it. For instance, Maas or other private enforcers may be able to ignore
civil rights and other restrictions on legal enforcement processes. Moreover,
Grossman (1995) argues that a coexistence in Nash equilibrium will provide
more enforcement than the state would choose if it were a monopoly which
maximized rents. Applying his insight here, state imitation may do worse
for the poor than leaving enforcement to the Maa. At the other extreme,
a su¢ciently strong state can regulate or eliminate private enforcement to
enact its own welfare-maximizing policy. There are likely to be economies
of scale in enforcement provision which enhance the power of the state.
More democratic states are more likely to place weight on the welfare of
the owners of lower value property. These considerations suggest that a
strong democratic state may drive out private enforcement. It is prema-
ture to build a model of state rivalry with the Maa, but the considerations
we present will be part of such a full political economy model.
For simplicity, suppose that the state and the private sector have the
same enforcement technology and that the state can collect lump sum taxes
to pay for the cost of enforcement. The welfare function of the state is
the expected value of property less the cost of defense:
where
and are the surpluses associ-
ated with protected and unprotected property respectively. The objective
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For the linear case, At the prot maximizing value of
Then
where the second equation follows from using the Maas rst order condition.
We assume that the state plays Nash against the predators so and are
taken as given. Welfare changes with and according to:
(10)
These should be compared to the rst order conditions for the Maa:
(11)
To compare the Maa and welfarist solutions, we consider evaluation of
the welfare derivatives (10) at the Maa solution values and see in which
direction and must move to approach the social welfare maximizing
values. whenever which holds in a
wide class of cases. (For example, with linear demand for the valuation of
property, we can show that is negative Then the state employs fewer
enforcers, since at the Maa solution (by the Maa s second order
condition). The intuition is that the rich who buy enforcement overvalue
it from a social point of view at the margin: Nevertheless,
the rich who obtain enforcement prefer the Maa because a typical rich
individual with valuation earns a surplus from dealing with the
Maa equal to a surplus which locally increasing in
A rise in also indirectly benets the poor, since in general equilibrium a
su¢cientnumberof predators are driven out so that also rises. We assume
the state plays Nash against the predators so the state does not internalize
this externality. In contrast to the clear results for ,
This arises because of the tradeo¤ of two forces, the monopoly power of
the Maa (which limits sales) vs. the negative externality enforcement
inicts on unprotected property (which limits state enforcement). With no
externality, and the state would protect all property, from (10),
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Moreover, the local concavity of in cannot be inferred from the local concavity of
the Maa s prot function at which means we cannot infer the welfare improving
direction of change in from the rst derivative only.
Whether the state protects less properties than the Maa depends on the equilib-
rium value of (the probability of successful self-defence) being su¢ciently high and is
increasing in as shown above.
What about competitive private enforcement compared to the social optimum? The
Maa and competive enforcers both protect the same proportion of property, while com-
petitive enforcement o¤ers more enforcers than does the Maa coalition, which in turn
o¤ers more than the optimal amount. Thus competition does worse than the Maa in
while o¤ering the same value of
fraction of property the state chooses to protect might be higher or lower
than that protected by the Maa, depending on the value of the exogenous
parameters.
The Appendix shows that for linear the state protects less property
than the Maa whenever the equilibrium is su¢ciently large. Exact
expressions for the critical value are derived. It is interesting to note that
the state will locally protect less properties when the outside opportunity
cost of predation ( is high. Associating with economic development,
we infer that cream skimming is more likely for more developed economies.
We have built a formal general equilibrium model of the Maa as a coalition
of enforcers of property rights. The model identies the conditions under
which Maa coalitions are likely to form and persist. Genuine enforce-
ment and extortion are complementary activities in the model; therefore
the Maa is likely to engage in both at the same time. Compared to com-
petitive enforcement, the Maa o¤ers too little enforcement at too high a
price. Compared to socially optimal enforcement, however, the Maa of-
fers too much enforcement because private enforcement ignores the e¤ect
of increased predation on the unprotected property. This, in turn, explains
why Maas can persist in the presence of a strong state.
The elements of this paper provide a framework for future work. First,
they indicate the payo¤ to a study of the industrial organization of the
Maa. What legal enforcement does it concede to the state and under what
circumstances? If, as in recent years, its main business is the protection26 From Wild West to the Godfather: Enforcement Market Structure
of illegal trade, why does it refrain from monopolizing the production of
illegal goods? We hope to explore these themes in future research.
A key simplication of this paper is that the amount of property to be
protected or predated is constant. Most forms of enforcement are likely to
increase the volume of the protected activity. This can be desirable if the
activity is good but undesirable if the activity is bad. In a sequel paper we
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8 Appendix
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8.1.2 Existence and Uniqueness
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The polynomial has two roots: and
An interior solution exist if are real and if at least one of them is
between 0 and 1.
1. are real
2. We show that the smallest root of the quadratic expression above is
always negative, thus if a solution exists it is unique:
if
If this is always true.
If always.
3. An interior solution exists if the largest root lies between and
if
If it is always true
If then always.
if
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8.2 Solution and Comparative Statics- Coalition Case.
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Where is a root of
Dene
An interior solution exist if are real and if at least one of them is
between and .
real
2. We show that the largest root of the quadratic expression above is
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if which is veried.
A su¢cient condition is which also guarantees that prots are positive.
>B A C > B
B<
B > AC < B AC > B
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If it is always true
If then always.
if
It is immediate to show that Taking squares and rearranging
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1. If a coalition is formed there will be fewer enforcers.
8.3 Coalition vs Monopolistic Competition: a Com-
parison
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This section compares the outcomes in the cases of monopolistic compe-
tition and coalition. Since the two cases di¤er only for the equation that
determines , instead of comparing parameter values directly we solve the
system as a function of and analyze how parameters change with .
the interior solution is:
and
where :
Prots are equal to:
We can show that:
Note that and that from which it follows
that
Since prots are positive if there is a coalition and zero under monopolis-
tic competition it follows that, given there must be more enforcers
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2. If a coalition is formed every property will be less secure, there will
be more bandits and the share of bandits attacking protected property will
be higher.
Note that The result follows from
and the fact that is smaller when a coalition is formed.
For the linear case we can obtain the welfare derivative with respect to
of Section 5 as
where we use
For Moreover, evaluating (6) for the linear case we
obtain
Substituting into we obtain:
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8.4.1 Welfare Maximizing State vs. the Maa (ap-
pendix to section 6)
=0
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For su¢ciently large, is decreasing in and locally concave in at
. Since for su¢ciently large, is locally concave in
This suggests that the optimal values of and are smaller than for the
Maa when is su¢ciently large. Of course, since endogenous variables
such as will change with and need not be a concave function of
and Thus it is di¢cult to compare the optimal values of and dened
by with the Maa solution in general. We derive
exact solutions for the critical value of for which the state protects less
property in the case where: and
Note that . For linearity we can show
that for The prot maximizing Maa solution for is
in the linear case. Then Since
comparing the optimal and Maa derivatives with respect
to at the prot maximizing we see that since the
state must have too small a value of for its rst order condition to hold
when evaluating at the Maa solution. By the state must reduce
to move toward its optimum Now evaluate the derivative of welfare with
respect to at the Maa value of Using the formula
for we have We know
using linearity. The social welfare derivative with respect to can now be
written as
Evaluating the square bracket expression at and factoring out
the welfare derivative is signed by:
Now we solve for a quasi-reduced form in as a function of We know that
the predator allocation condition implies Linearity of
demand and implies The predator allocation condition
then implies that and Substituting into
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As plotted in Figure 3, this expression can have either sign, depending on
the free parameters which determine equilibrium .
The critical interior value of for which the derivative of welfare with
respect to is equal to zero is solved from
, The solution is :
The diagram shows that cream skimming is the solution when the Maa
equilibrium value of exceeds . For this range, social welfare is decreas-
ing in when evaluated at the Maa solution. Social welfare is always
decreasing in at the Maa solution.
We must check that positive prots are earned by the Maa in this
range. Maa prots are given by where the
latter equality follows from the optimal selection of by the Maa. The two
conditions imply that positive prots require Combined with the
predator allocation condition in the linear case, this means -
Figure 4 plots the left hand side as a function of . This shows that for
any value of which emerges as an equilibrium value, Maa prots are
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